Evolutionary dynamics of nationalism and migration

André Barreira da Silva Rocha ()

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2013, vol. 392, issue 15, 3183-3197

Abstract: I present a dynamic evolutionary game model to address the relation between nationalism against immigrants and assimilation of the latter into the host country culture. I assume a country composed of two different large polymorphic populations, one of native citizens and the other of immigrants. A native citizen may behave nationalistically or may welcome immigrants. Immigrants may have an interest in learning the host country language or not. Evolution is modeled using replicator dynamics (RD). I also account for the presence of an enclave of immigrants in the host country. In the RD, the latter represents the immigrants’ own population effect, which contribution to fitness is controlled using a parameter ρ, 0≤ρ≤1, that represents the enclave size. In line with the empirical literature on migration, the existence of an enclave of immigrants makes assimilation less likely to occur. For large values of ρ, complete assimilation may not occur even if immigrants and natives share very close cultures and norms. Government policy regarding nationalism is modeled both exogenously and endogenously. A single or multiple asymptotically stable states exist for all cases studied but one in which the dynamics is similar to that found in the predator–prey model of Lotka–Volterra for competing species.

Keywords: Econophysics; Sociophysics; Replicator dynamics; Migration; Nationalism; Enclave (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037843711300263X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

Related works:
Working Paper: Evolutionary Dynamics of Nationalism and Migration (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:392:y:2013:i:15:p:3183-3197

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2013.03.030

Access Statistics for this article

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis

More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().