Changes of behavior tendency in the evolutionary minority game

Yu-Xia Zhang, Wen-Yao Liang and Xue-Mei Liu

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2014, vol. 414, issue C, 227-232

Abstract: It is by now well established that the agents change from extreme behavior to confusion when the situation changed from easy time to depression in the evolutionary minority game. However in this letter we explore the dynamics of evolving population with negative values of the reward, and demonstrate that the one-time phase change is a little part. In particular, we show the changes of behavior tendency and reveal the underlying dynamics of the changes.

Keywords: Economic physics; Changes of behavior tendency; Brownian motion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:414:y:2014:i:c:p:227-232

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2014.07.051

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