Impact of shill intervention on the evolution of cooperation

Changhao Sun and Haibin Duan

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2015, vol. 434, issue C, 171-180

Abstract: The practical significance of effective intervention in collective behavior has its roots not only in frequent migration in the modern society, but also in the actual demands of real-world applications for system efficiency improvement. Within the framework of soft control, this paper focuses on an evolutionary public goods game staged on a scale free network and explores the dependence of the evolution of cooperation on the intervention of a fraction of shills, who follow the Fixed-Cost-per-Player paradigm while the locals follow the Fixed-Cost-per-Game paradigm. We demonstrate that higher cooperation levels and better social welfare could be simultaneously induced by tuning the distribution coefficient α, where desirable outcomes are associated with large α>0 for tense dilemmas while small α<0 leads to satisfactory results when the enhancement factor γ increases. Moreover, we observe a transition of the composition of equilibrium cooperators from full dominance of shills to co-existence of shills and locals, and the boundary has a positive correlation with α. These results are somehow affected when we attenuate the heterogeneity of the network by relating individual fitness to payoffs averaged over its connectivity. Our findings may not only shed some light on the mechanism behind the evolution of cooperation from the perspective of external intervention, but also provide a feasible way to effectively intervene in the evolutionary outcomes of negative scenarios.

Keywords: Public goods game; Scale free network; Soft control; Cooperation evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437115003726
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:434:y:2015:i:c:p:171-180

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2015.04.013

Access Statistics for this article

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis

More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().