Social optimality in quantum Bayesian games

Azhar Iqbal, James M. Chappell and Derek Abbott

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2015, vol. 436, issue C, 798-805

Abstract: A significant aspect of the study of quantum strategies is the exploration of the game-theoretic solution concept of the Nash equilibrium in relation to the quantization of a game. Pareto optimality is a refinement on the set of Nash equilibria. A refinement on the set of Pareto optimal outcomes is known as social optimality in which the sum of players’ payoffs is maximized. This paper analyzes social optimality in a Bayesian game that uses the setting of generalized Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen experiments for its physical implementation. We show that for the quantum Bayesian game a direct connection appears between the violation of Bell’s inequality and the social optimal outcome of the game and that it attains a superior socially optimal outcome.

Keywords: Quantum game theory; Bayesian games; Social Optimality; Quantum Bayesian games; Generalized EPR experiments; Quantum probabilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437115004355
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:436:y:2015:i:c:p:798-805

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2015.05.020

Access Statistics for this article

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis

More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().