EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

How the indirect reciprocity with co-evolving norm and strategy for 2 × 2 prisoner’s dilemma game works for emerging cooperation

Jun Tanimoto and Hirokji Sagara

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2015, vol. 438, issue C, 595-602

Abstract: We built a new indirect reciprocity model based on binary image scores, where an agent’s strategy and norm co-evolve. The norm, meaning what behavior is evaluated as “good” or “bad,” stipulates how image scores of two agents playing a game is altered, which has been presumed to be a fixed value in most previous studies. Also, unlike former studies, our model allows an agent to play with an agent who has a different norm. This point of relaxing the freedom of the model pulls down cooperation level vis-à-vis the case where an agent always plays with another one having same norm. However, it is observed that a rather larger dilemma shows robust cooperation establishing compared with a smaller dilemma, since a norm that punishes a so-called second-order free-rider is prompted. To encourage the evolution of norms to be able to punish second-order free-riders, a society needs a small number of defectors. This is elucidated by the fact that cases with action error are more cooperative than those without action error.

Keywords: Evolutionary game; Prisoner’s dilemma; Norm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437115006159
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:438:y:2015:i:c:p:595-602

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2015.07.006

Access Statistics for this article

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis

More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:438:y:2015:i:c:p:595-602