Heuristics guide cooperative behaviors in public goods game

Yongjie Wang and Tong Chen

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2015, vol. 439, issue C, 59-65

Abstract: In public goods game (PGG), player’s cooperative behavior is not pure economical rationality, but social preference and prosocial intuition play extremely important roles as well. Social preference and prosocial intuition can be guided by heuristics from one’s neighbors in daily life. To better investigate the impacts of heuristics on the evolution of cooperation, four types of agents are introduced into our spatial PGG. Through numerical simulations, results show that the larger percentages of cooperators with independent thought, the easier emergence and maintenance of collective cooperative behaviors. Additionally, we find that differentia heuristic capability has great effect on the equilibrium of PGG. Cooperation can be obviously promoted, when heuristic capability of cooperators with independent thought is stronger than that of defectors with independent thought. Finally, we observe that cooperators with independent thought and defectors with independent thought are favorable for the formation of some high quality clusters, which can resist the invasion between each other. Our work may help us understand more clearly the mechanism of cooperation in real world.

Keywords: Heuristics; Social preference; Independent thought; Evolution of cooperation; Public goods game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:439:y:2015:i:c:p:59-65

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2015.07.031

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