Co-evolution of payoff strategy and interaction strategy in prisoner’s dilemma game

Kangjie Zhang and Hongyan Cheng

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2016, vol. 461, issue C, 439-445

Abstract: Co-evolutionary dynamical models, providing a realistic paradigm for investigating complex system, have been extensively studied. In this paper, the co-evolution of payoff strategy and interaction strategy is studied. Starting with an initial Gaussian distribution of payoff strategy r with the mean u and the variance q, we focus on the final distribution of the payoff strategy. We find that final distribution of the payoff strategy may display different structures depending on parameters. In the ranges u<−1 and u>3, the distribution displays a single-peak structure which is symmetric about r=u. The distribution manifests itself as a double-peak structure in the range −1Keywords: Co-evolution; Prisoner’s dilemma game; Payoff strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437116302576
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:461:y:2016:i:c:p:439-445

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2016.04.045

Access Statistics for this article

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis

More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().