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Aspiration-induced dormancy promotes cooperation in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma games

Ya-Shan Chen, Han-Xin Yang and Wen-Zhong Guo

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2017, vol. 469, issue C, 625-630

Abstract: An interesting phenomenon is often observed in realistic systems. In the process of games, if the expected payoff from game interactions is not achieved, players would refuse to participate in the games. Inspired by this fact, we propose an aspiration-induced dormant mechanism, in which players quit the games and become dormant if their payoffs are less than the aspiration level. After a dormant period, they continue to play the game with others. Our results indicate an intermediate aspiration value, leading to the highest cooperation level in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma games. The effects of the dormant period are also studied.

Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma game; Cooperation; Dormancy; Aspiration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:469:y:2017:i:c:p:625-630

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2016.11.082

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