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Characterizing segregation in the Schelling–Voter model

I. Caridi, J.P. Pinasco, N. Saintier and P. Schiaffino

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2017, vol. 487, issue C, 125-142

Abstract: In this work we analyze several aspects related with segregation patterns appearing in the Schelling–Voter model in which an unhappy agent can change her location or her state in order to live in a neighborhood where she is happy. Briefly, agents may be in two possible states, each one represents an individually-chosen feature, such as the language she speaks or the opinion she supports; and an individual is happy in a neighborhood if she has, at least, some proportion of agents of her own type, defined in terms of a fixed parameter T.

Keywords: Schelling model; Voter model; Segregation; Crowds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:487:y:2017:i:c:p:125-142