Dynamic optimal strategies in transboundary pollution game under learning by doing

Shuhua Chang, Weihua Qin and Xinyu Wang

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2018, vol. 490, issue C, 139-147

Abstract: In this paper, we present a transboundary pollution game, in which emission permits trading and pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are considered. In this model, the abatement cost mainly depends on the level of pollution abatement and the experience of using pollution abatement technology. We use optimal control theory to investigate the optimal emission paths and the optimal pollution abatement strategies under cooperative and noncooperative games, respectively. Additionally, the effects of parameters on the results have been examined.

Keywords: Transboundary pollution game; Emission permits trading; Abatement policy; Learning by doing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:490:y:2018:i:c:p:139-147

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2017.08.010

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