Contribution inequality in the spatial public goods game: Should the rich contribute more?

Jing Tu

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2018, vol. 496, issue C, 9-14

Abstract: Scale-free property exists in resource distribution, and the rich pay more in public goods is commonplace in reality. What will happen if the rich are expected to contribute more in the spatial public goods game? This paper therefore proposes a new contribution paradigm, in which individual contribution is determined by his payoff in the last evolution step. Tunable parameter w is used to characterize the contribution rate of nodes whose payoff is larger than the average. The results of simulations reveal that the impact of w on cooperation is associated with the enhancement factor r. When r is low, the higher w is, the lower the cooperation rate is. With the increment of r, the value of w to optimize cooperation rate increases with r. The relationship of cooperation rate and wealth on the network has also been investigated. Interestingly, higher cooperation rate does not always lead to higher wealth. Finally, the impact of w on the wealth distribution on the network is explored. The higher w reduces the inequality in wealth distribution by the shrinking of lower-class, which is enhanced by a higher r.

Keywords: Public goods game; The rich contribute more; Evolution of cooperation; Wealth transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:496:y:2018:i:c:p:9-14

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2017.12.114

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