Dynamic-sensitive cooperation in the presence of multiple strategy updating rules

Attila Szolnoki and Zsuzsa Danku

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2018, vol. 511, issue C, 371-377

Abstract: The importance of microscopic details on cooperation level is an intensively studied aspect of evolutionary game theory. Interestingly, these details become crucial on heterogeneous populations where individuals may possess diverse traits. By introducing a coevolutionary model in which not only strategies but also individual dynamical features may evolve we revealed that the formerly established conclusion is not necessarily true when different updating rules are on stage. In particular, we apply two strategy updating rules, imitation and Death–Birth rule, which allow local selection in a spatial system. Our observation highlights that the microscopic feature of dynamics, like the level of learning activity, could be a fundamental factor even if all players share the same trait uniformly.

Keywords: Cooperation; Social dilemma; Imitation; Death–birth rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:511:y:2018:i:c:p:371-377

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2018.08.007

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