The impact of lotteries on cooperation in the public goods game
Tong Chen and
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2018, vol. 512, issue C, 925-934
Lottery tickets have a sustained appeal to people, but the effect of lottery on cooperative behaviors in the public goods game (PGG) is not clear. Here we come up with the lottery reward mechanism to investigate the evolution of cooperation, which considers the individual risk appetite heterogeneity and lottery utility at the same time. Evolutionary results show that cooperators dominate the situation and nearly reach a state of global cooperation with the advent of lottery tickets. The greater the winning rate ( w) or the higher lottery bonus (R), the easier the cooperation will be. Besides, the combination of a moderate value of w and a small value of R can help the organizer who is responsible for the provision of public goods, to achieve the optimal result in stimulating collective donations. Our research not only helps organizers save costs in the provision of public goods, but also helps us understand the role of lotteries in promoting cooperation.
Keywords: Lottery reward mechanism; Risk appetite; Cost; Public goods game; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:512:y:2018:i:c:p:925-934
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