The effect of link rewiring on a coevolutionary common pool resource game
Yuchen Du and
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2018, vol. 512, issue C, 935-944
For exploitation of social–ecological systems, cooperation has been considered to be a prerequisite to avoid the tragedy of the commons. As was theorized, coupling strategic and ecological dynamics could cause social regime shifts when the resource supply is sufficiently abundant. Regime shifts indicate the collapse of social cooperation and the loss of natural resources. The phenomenon has been demonstrated in an integrated society with static complex social networks; however, exploiting agents could dynamically switch their partners (i.e., link rewiring in social networks) in the real world. In this study, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in a coupled social–ecological model in which the ecosystem evolves according to the intrinsic rules and human extracting strategy, and agents are allowed to either change their strategies or switch their partners. Our results show that link rewiring has positive and negative effects on the evolution of cooperation in the common pool resource game according to both social and ecological attributes. Importantly, the partner switching can stabilize the cooperation when the resource has high inflow or reproductivity. These results broaden our understanding of the coevolution of structural, strategic, and ecological dynamics in a common pool resource game; the results also illustrate the importance of reputation mechanisms in the sustainable development of social–ecological systems.
Keywords: Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Social network; Regime shift; Social–ecological system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:512:y:2018:i:c:p:935-944
Access Statistics for this article
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis
More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().