The effect of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in multigame

Kaipeng Hu, Hao Guo, Yini Geng and Lei Shi

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2019, vol. 516, issue C, 267-272

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the effect of conformist on the evolution of cooperation in multigame. In particular, we divide the whole population into two groups. One side is payoff-driven player, who updates his strategy by learning. The other side is conformist-driven player, who adopts the most popular strategy. Simulation results show that there is an optimal value of fraction for conformist-driven players, where cooperation can be best promoted when b is small. However, cooperation will be impeded with the fraction of conformist-driven players when b is relatively large. For these results, we give some explanations from the perspective of clusters and strategy transition, and investigate the robustness of this mechanism on different topologies.

Keywords: Payoff-driven; Conformist-driven; Cooperation; Prisoner’s dilemma; Snowdrift game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:516:y:2019:i:c:p:267-272

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2018.10.012

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