Promotion of cooperation in evolutionary game dynamics under asymmetric information

Xuesong Liu, Qiuhui Pan, Mingfeng He and Aizhi Liu

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2019, vol. 521, issue C, 258-266

Abstract: The emergence and abundance of cooperation in the population of selfish individuals is a challenging problem in evolutionary dynamics. Here we propose two asymmetric information systems in which individuals adopt two different rules to update their strategies. One of the stochastic evolutionary models is mixed by aspiration-driven rule and local information-driven rule, while the other model is mixed by local rule and imitation-driven rule. The proposed heterogeneous systems promote at least one kind of individuals’ cooperation. Compared with the standard imitation dynamics and local dynamics, there is always a non-zero probability to support the formation of cooperation in the system with the aspiration and other rules. Furthermore, the more aspiration-driven individuals lead to higher fraction of local-driven cooperators. In the other case, the invasion of individuals who use local information is conductive to promoting the imitation-driven ones’ cooperation. In both heterogeneous systems, we find that the individuals who use less information are more likely to cooperate than the ones who use higher information.

Keywords: Evolutionary game dynamics; Stochastic dynamics; Asymmetric information; Evolution of cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:521:y:2019:i:c:p:258-266

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2019.01.032

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