Mean field model of a game for power

Tatiana Karataieva, Volodymyr Koshmanenko, Małgorzata J. Krawczyk and Krzysztof Kułakowski

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2019, vol. 525, issue C, 535-547

Abstract: Our aim is to model a game for power (equivalent to total energy) as a dynamical process, where an excess of power possessed by a player allows him to gain even more power. Such a positive feedback is often termed as the Matthew effect. Analytical and numerical methods allow to identify a set of stationary states, i.e. fixed points of the model dynamics. The positions of the unstable fixed points give an insight on the basins of attraction of the stable fixed points. The results are interpreted in terms of modeling of coercive power.

Keywords: Social systems; Power distribution; Nonlinear maps; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:525:y:2019:i:c:p:535-547

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2019.03.110

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