Altruism and fairness in Schelling’s segregation model

Julien Flaig and Nicolas Houy

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2019, vol. 527, issue C

Abstract: In Schelling’s segregation model (Schelling, 1971), the successive moves of agents optimizing their own locations lead to a suboptimal segregated distribution of the population, even though all agents have the same preference for mixed neighborhoods. The reason is that when moving, individuals have an impact on others that they do not internalize in their optimization problems. Jensen et al. (2018) showed that even a very small fraction of altruistic individuals internalizing the common objective of reaching a mixed distribution of the population is enough to solve inefficiencies.

Keywords: Segregation; Fairness; Agent-based model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:527:y:2019:i:c:s0378437119307563

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2019.121298

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