Cournot competition and “green” innovation under efficiency-improving learning by doing

Zhongjun Wei, Yongxi Yi and Chunyan Fu

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2019, vol. 531, issue C

Abstract: We develop a Stackelberg differential game model between a regulator and an oligopoly for “green” innovation. The efficiency improvement of investment on production capacity and pollution abatement R&D with experience accumulating from efficiency-improving learning by doing is taken into account. Our objective is to utilize optimal control theory to investigate the dynamic general equilibrium of Cournot competition and “green” innovation, and derive the steady-state equilibrium properties and optimal investment levels on production capacity and pollution abatement.

Keywords: “green” innovation; Cournot competition; Emission tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:531:y:2019:i:c:s0378437119310143

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2019.121762

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