Inter-group selection of strategy promotes cooperation in public goods game

Jianwei Wang, Wenshu Xu, Wei Chen, Fengyuan Yu and Jialu He

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2021, vol. 583, issue C

Abstract: Affected by geographical or social factors, human communities are organized with changeless groups for teamwork. Within groups, defection dominates because the payoffs of defectors are often higher than those of cooperators; among groups, higher cooperation level makes individuals wealthier. For the previous mechanism of evolutionary dynamics leading individuals to imitate the rich in their groups, defective strategy evolves. However, individuals who belong to different groups and have no direct interaction of interests actually could influence each other. Due to the similarity of environment, the strategies among groups have the channel and necessity of dissemination. To this end, we propose an evolutionary game model with inter-group selection of strategy. By simulations, the effects of groups’ selection preference, group size, multiplier factor, imitation intensity and competition among groups on cooperative evolution in populations are studied. We find that when the group makes selection without preference, the intensity of the choice positively affects the level of cooperation; the strategy selection with preference can effectively increase the group cooperation rate.

Keywords: Evolutionary game; Cooperation; Public goods game; Strategy selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:583:y:2021:i:c:s0378437121005653

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2021.126292

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