A moderate self-interest preference promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

Chun-Xiao Jia and Run-Ran Liu

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2022, vol. 589, issue C

Abstract: In real society, the defective individuals seek to exploit the cooperators for maximizing self interests, and cooperators may also protect themselves against losses by sound investment strategies. In this study, the effects of investment-allocation scheme on the evolutionary cooperation of spatial public goods game is explored by an introduced parameter α controlling the fractions of investment operated by the investors themselves. That is to say, each player has a degree of self-interest preference and invests a fraction α of resource into the group centered by herself/himself, then the remaining fraction 1−α is allocated into the groups centered by nearest neighbors equally. For low enhancement levels, the cooperation level can be best promoted by a moderate value of α, and too large or too low values of α are not good for the persistence of cooperation. For high enhancement levels, the self-interest preference hinder the persistence of cooperation and the cooperation level reduces monotonously as α increases. Our results prove that the optimal investment-allocation scheme for the persistence of cooperation may vary with the enhancement level, which supplies a new perspective for understanding the emergence of cooperation or cooperation promotion in egoistical individuals.

Keywords: Social dilemma; Cooperation; Evolutionary games; Self-interest preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437121008906
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:589:y:2022:i:c:s0378437121008906

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2021.126649

Access Statistics for this article

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis

More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().