Redistribution based on willingness to cooperate promotes cooperation while intensifying equality in heterogeneous populations

Jianwei Wang, Wenshu Xu, Xingjian Zhang, Nianxuan Zhao and Fengyuan Yu

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2023, vol. 610, issue C

Abstract: Public resource redistribution is an important means of social income regulation, which maintains social income equality by transferring payoffs to low-income groups, usually in the form of taxes and social services. Originally studied as a means of maintaining social equality, redistribution has also been used to address social dilemmas through evolutionary game theory in recent years. However, the definition of low-income groups in previous studies is not comprehensive. They are used to studying the inequality generated by participants during the game but ignore the inequality caused by initial endowment differences. At the same time, is it beneficial to the whole that redistribution requires the rich to subsidize the poor, but leads the rich to choose defection (tax evasion, etc.)? How should the redistribution mechanism work to reduce inequality while facilitating the spread of altruistic behavior? To explore whether the redistribution mechanism can reach a balance between promoting cooperation and maintaining equality of payoffs, we develop a generic public resource redistribution framework based on heterogeneous populations by a spatial public goods game model. We control redistribution preferences for willingness to cooperate and initial endowments by parameters α and β. With a heterogeneous population, we find that helping the poor through redistribution mechanisms does not have significant positive effects and may even result in exploitation of the rich; focusing on participants’ willingness to cooperate rather than total investment can promote cooperation, enhance overall payoffs and reduce inequality.

Keywords: Evolutionary game; Cooperation; Public goods game; Redistribution; Inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:610:y:2023:i:c:s0378437122009293

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2022.128371

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