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Repeated quantum game as a stochastic game: Effects of the shadow of the future and entanglement

Archan Mukhopadhyay, Saikat Sur, Tanay Saha, Shubhadeep Sadhukhan and Sagar Chakraborty

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2024, vol. 637, issue C

Abstract: We present a systematic investigation of the quantum games, constructed using a novel repeated game protocol, when played repeatedly ad infinitum. We focus on establishing that such repeated games – by virtue of inherent quantum-mechanical randomness – can be mapped to the paradigm of stochastic games. Subsequently, using the setup of two-player–two-action games, we explore the pure reactive strategies belonging to the set of reactive strategies, whose support in the quantum games is no longer countably finite but rather non-denumerably infinite. We find that how two pure strategies fare against each other is crucially dependent on the discount factor (the probability of occurrence of every subsequent round) and how much entangled the quantum states of the players are. We contrast the results obtained with the corresponding results in the classical setup and find fundamental differences between them: e.g, when the underlying game is the prisoner’s dilemma, in the quantum game setup, always-defect strategy can be beaten by the tit-for-tat strategy for high enough discount factor.

Keywords: Stochastic games; Repeated games; Nash equilibrium; Prisoner’s dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:637:y:2024:i:c:s0378437124001213

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2024.129613

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Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis

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