Effects of third-order reputation mechanism on the dynamic evolution of cooperation in mixed-games

Xin Ge, Jian Yang, Xi He, Yue Liu, YiXiang Zhao and Lili Li

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2025, vol. 660, issue C

Abstract: Understanding large-scale cooperative behavior among intelligent individuals is one of the greatest challenges faced by scholars in the 21st century. Real-world complexities shape decision-making, influenced by economic and cultural differences, resulting in inconsistent game preferences. Moreover, rational individuals possess the ability to proactively avoid risks. Therefore, the theoretical framework of mixed-games supplemented with an “isolation strategy” is particularly apt for studying the evolution of cooperative behaviors. To delve deeper into the reputation’s role in evolutionary game dynamics among intelligent individuals, this study proposes a third-order reputation mechanism for comprehensive and objective evaluation of behavior strategies. Under this mechanism, when assessing the merits of an individual’s actions, it is essential to consider not only their own behavior strategy but also the external environment, namely, the reputation of both parties in the game. Simulation results indicate that introducing the third-order reputation mechanism in mixed-game evolution significantly promotes cooperative behavior emergence and prosperity.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Cooperation; Mixed-games; Third-order reputation mechanism; Isolation strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:660:y:2025:i:c:s0378437125000160

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2025.130364

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