EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Modeling territorial disputes with Hawk–Dove games

Daniel Rodrigues, Ian Braga and Lucas Wardil

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2025, vol. 676, issue C

Abstract: We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of territorial contests by extending the classical Hawk–Dove game to explicitly incorporate site exchange into the game’s payoff structure. In our model, individuals occupy sites on a square lattice, with a fixed fraction designated as high-value territories that confer fitness benefits. Territorial disputes are resolved through Hawk–Dove interactions, and site occupation changes accordingly. Our analysis shows that, although the average payoff matrix remains the same as in traditional models, coupling of payoff determination with site exchanges reduces the prevalence of non-aggressive strategies. We also examine how the spatial distribution of valuable sites affects outcomes, showing that structured patterns – such as chessboard-like arrangements – can sustain Doves under specific dynamic regimes. Furthermore, when both Hawks incur conflict costs, Doves can persist even in resource-rich environments. These findings highlight the importance of coupling mobility, spatial structure, and payoff mechanisms in understanding the evolution of conflict and cooperation in territorial systems.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Territorial disputes; Hawk–Dove game; Aggressive behavior; Spatial games; Agent-based simulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437125005278
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:676:y:2025:i:c:s0378437125005278

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2025.130875

Access Statistics for this article

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis

More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-09-09
Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:676:y:2025:i:c:s0378437125005278