Turned on or turned out? Campaign advertising, information and voting
Daniel Houser (),
Rebecca Morton () and
Thomas Stratmann ()
European Journal of Political Economy, 2011, vol. 27, issue 4, 708-727
We present results from laboratory experimental elections in which voter information is endogenously provided by candidates and voting is voluntary. We also compare advertisements that are costless to voters with those that reduce voter payoffs. We find that informative advertisements increase voter participation and thus informative campaign advertising turns out voters. However, the effect of information is less than that found in previous experimental studies where information is exogenously provided by the experimenter. Furthermore, we find that when advertising by winning candidates reduces voter payoffs, informed voters are less likely to participate, thus are turned off rather than turned out. Finally, we discover that candidates tend to overadvertise, and contrary to theoretical predictions, advertise significantly more when voting is voluntary than when it is compulsory.
Keywords: Campaign finance; Abstention; Turnout; Elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (16) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Turned Off or Turned Out? Campaign Advertising,Information, and Voting (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:4:p:708-727
Access Statistics for this article
European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung
More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().