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Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement

Christian Traxler and Joachim Winter ()

European Journal of Political Economy, 2012, vol. 28, issue 3, 390-398

Abstract: We analyze survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction law violations – such as evading taxes, drunk driving and fare dodging – by disapproval or social exclusion. Our data show that people condition their willingness to sanction a norm violation on their belief about its frequency. The more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower individuals' inclination to punish it. Our findings are in line with models of social norms and offer an alternative interpretation of the ‘broken windows’ effect.

Keywords: Norm enforcement; Social norms; Survey evidence; Law violation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 K42 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Working Paper: Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement (2012)
Working Paper: Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement (2009) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:3:p:390-398

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.03.001

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European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

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