Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement

Christian Traxler and Joachim Winter ()

No 2009_03, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We discuss survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction norm violations – such as evading taxes, drunk driving, fare dodging, or skiving off work – by expressing disapproval or social exclusion. Our data suggest that people condition their sanctioning behavior on their belief about the frequency of norm violations. The more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower the individuals' inclination to punish it. Based on an instrumental variable approach, we demonstrate that this pattern reflects a causal relationship.

Keywords: Norm Enforcement; Sanctioning; Social Norms; Survey Evidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 K42 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement (2012)
Working Paper: Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement (2012)
Working Paper: Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_03

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