Parties as efficiency-improving gatekeepers in rent-seeking societies

Topi Miettinen and Panu Poutvaara

European Journal of Political Economy, 2015, vol. 38, issue C, 87-101

Abstract: Anti-corruption laws forbid selling public job nominations. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the nominations may invest in good relationships with the nominators. This provides a legal way to influence the decision. Such networking is costly, however. Thus, rent-seeking results in excessive networking. We present a simple model featuring such effects and show that efficiency may be improved if political parties interfere with the nominations. Political parties may reduce wasteful networking, thanks to exclusive membership contracts. Parties can require that politicians belonging to the party promote the nomination of other party members, thus, reducing incentives to cultivate inter-party connections.

Keywords: Political parties; Political nominations; Rent-seeking; Connections; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D85 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:38:y:2015:i:c:p:87-101

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.01.003

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