Economics at your fingertips  

Do federal reserve bank presidents have a regional bias?

Alexander Jung () and Sophia Latsos

European Journal of Political Economy, 2015, vol. 40, issue PA, 173-183

Abstract: This paper examines whether the monetary policy deliberations of the FOMC have been influenced by regional considerations. We explain individual interest rate preferences by district, and use real-time data to estimate Taylor-type rules (sample 1990 to 2008). In line with the literature, this paper confirms that regional variables are explanatory factors of the interest rate preferences of most Reserve Bank Presidents. A new finding is that only few Reserve Bank Presidents display a regional bias in their interest rate preferences. Given their nature and size, these biases did not impede on the Fed's capacity to set interest rates with a nationwide focus.

Keywords: Individual Taylor-type rules; Regional bias; Real-time data; Interest rate preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C30 D72 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Do federal reserve bank presidents have a regional bias? (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2019-09-20
Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:40:y:2015:i:pa:p:173-183