Do federal reserve bank presidents have a regional bias?

Alexander Jung and Sophia Latsos

No 1731, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: This paper examines whether the interest rate preferences of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents are subject to a regional bias. In order to evaluate the regional bias hypothesis, we augment individual Taylor rules for the Federal Reserve Bank Presidents (sample 1989 to 2006) with regional variables and test for their influence on the Presidents JEL Classification: C12, C30, D72, E58

Keywords: augmented Taylor rule; interest rate preferences; real-time data; regional bias; SUR model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mon
Note: 2106626
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Do federal reserve bank presidents have a regional bias? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20141731

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