Warlords, famine and food aid: Who fights, who starves?

Max Blouin and Stephane Pallage

European Journal of Political Economy, 2016, vol. 45, issue C, 18-38

Abstract: We examine the effects of famine relief efforts (food aid) in regions undergoing civil war. In our model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid. They hire their troops within a population with varied productivities or skills. We determine the equilibrium distribution of labor in this environment and study how the existence and allocation strategies of a benevolent food aid agency affect this equilibrium. Our model allows us to predict who will be recruited, who will receive aid, and who will die of famine in every circumstance.

Keywords: Food aid; Civil war; Warlords; Famine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Warlords, Famine and Food Aid: Who Fights, Who Starves? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:45:y:2016:i:c:p:18-38

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.09.002

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