Warlords, Famine and Food Aid: Who Fights, Who Starves?
Max Blouin and
Stephane Pallage
Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE
Abstract:
We examine the effects of famine relief efforts (food aid) in regions undergoing civil war. In our model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid and use it to feed soldiers. They hire their troops within a population of farmers heterogeneous in skills. We determine the equilibrium distribution of labor in this environment and study how the existence and allocation strategies of a benevolent food aid agency affect this equilibrium. Our model allows us to precisely predict who will fight and who will work in every circumstance.
Keywords: Food aid; civil war; warlords; famine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F35 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
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http://www.cirpee.org/fileadmin/documents/Cahiers_2009/CIRPEE09-47.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Warlords, famine and food aid: Who fights, who starves? (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0947
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