Economics at your fingertips  

Political favoritism by powerful politicians: Evidence from chief ministers in India

Umair Khalil, Mandar Oak () and Sundar Ponnusamy

European Journal of Political Economy, 2021, vol. 66, issue C

Abstract: We study whether in single-member-district legislative systems, powerful politicians engage in political favoritism towards their constituents. The focus is on the chief ministers of Indian state governments. Using night light intensity as a measure of economic activity, we find that a constituency represented by a sitting chief minister exhibits about 13 percentage increase in luminosity relative to all other constituencies. The effect comes predominantly from the cases where the chief minister's constituency lies outside their birth region. Neighboring constituencies, particularly those with strategic political value, also benefit from this windfall, suggesting the mechanism at play is likely to be political expediency rather than in-group favoritism.

Keywords: Distributive politics; Ethnic favoritism; Rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Political Favoritism by Powerful Politicians: Evidence from Chief Ministers in India (2020) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101949

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2021-08-26
Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0176268020300975