Obedience to the symbol of authority: Experimental evidence on the symbolic source of legitimate authority

Zhicheng Xu

European Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 78, issue C

Abstract: The performance of government activities, including law enforcement and regulation, depends on whether citizens perceive them as legitimate. Although substantial studies have explored the institutional sources of legitimacy, how non-institutional factors affect perceived legitimacy remains unclear. Human societies have a long history of employing symbolic icons to enhance the legitimacy of a given authority. This study reports a laboratory experiment of public goods that investigates whether (and to what extent) symbolic factors enhance perceived legitimacy. In the contexts of various incentive schemes and transparency levels, an “authority” in each group decides whether to target a “citizen” for punishment after observing the contributions of “citizens,” and untargeted citizens then choose to support or hinder the authority. A symbolic scepter is issued to the authority in the treated group, whereas this symbol is absent in the control group. The experimental results suggest that the political symbol significantly enhances the authority's legitimacy regardless of the payment scheme and information transparency. A further analysis shows that the political symbol is not associated with the authority's choices regarding enforcement. Rather, the symbol's effect on perceived legitimacy is primarily driven by the citizens' side—that is, the increasing intrinsic tendency to support authority.

Keywords: Authority; Collective actions; Insignia; Legitimacy; Political symbol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:78:y:2023:i:c:s0176268022001574

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102354

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