State building and social control

Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein

European Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 88, issue C

Abstract: A modicum of homogeneity of social norms is deemed valuable by societies, and social control is a way to achieve it. In this paper, we posit an economy populated by masses and elites, whereby the social norms of the former affect the welfare of the latter group. Consequently, the elites may exercise social control to induce the masses to embrace norms aligned with their own preferences. Our analysis reveals, in particular, that social control may go hand in hand with the prevalence of mass education, which induces homogeneity of norms. This is shown to be consistent with historical evidence on the emergence of public schooling.

Keywords: Social norms; Social control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H50 I25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:88:y:2025:i:c:s017626802500059x

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102699

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