State Building and Social Control

Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein
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Alberto Chong: Department of Economics, Georgia State University and Department of Economics, Universidad del Pacifico
Mark Gradstein: Department of Economics, Ben Gurion University, CEPR, CESifo, and IZA

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: A modicum of homogeneity of social norms is deemed valuable by societies, and social control is a way to achieve it. In this paper, we posit an economy populated by masses and elites, whereby the social norms of the former affect the welfare of the latter group. Consequently, the elites may exercise social control to induce the masses to embrace norms aligned with their own preferences. Our analysis reveals, in particular, that social control may go hand in hand with the prevalence of mass education, which induces homogeneity of norms. This, in turn, is argued to be consistent with historical evidence on the emergence of public schooling.

Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2025-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2503

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