Coordination of competing supply chains with news-vendor and buyback contract

Desheng Wu

International Journal of Production Economics, 2013, vol. 144, issue 1, 1-13

Abstract: Under the competing supply chain framework, we examine the impact of buyback policy on retail price, order quantity and wholesale price in a duopoly of two manufacturer–retailer supply chains. Demand is assumed to follow a general distribution similar to a newsvendor case. We consider two channel policies for both competing supply chains: Vertical Integration (VI) and Manufacturer's Stackelberg (MS). We show that buyback strategy can lead to a higher profit than non-buyback in both VI and MS in competing supply chains, which is consistent with existing result in a single supply chain. We also show that the profits obtained by the supply chain individuals and the entire supply chain profit increase as the chain competition increases.

Keywords: Competing supply chain; Buyback contract; Supply chain coordination; Newsvendor; Vertical Integration (VI); Manufacturer's Stackelberg (MS) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:144:y:2013:i:1:p:1-13

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.11.032

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