 Competing in a supply chain via full-refund and no-refund customer returns policiesJing Chen and Ravneet Grewal International Journal of Production Economics, 2013, vol. 146, issue 1, 246-258 Abstract: In this paper, we address the problem in which a manufacturer in a supply chain supplies a product to two competing retailers. Both retailers, facing customer returns, must decide on prices for the product. The manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader in the supply chain and the two retailers decide prices after the manufacturer announces the wholesale price. One retailer is well established, offering a full-refund policy, while the other retailer is a new entrant into the market place. The new entrant retailer needs to decide whether to implement a full-refund policy or a no-refund policy, in order to compete with the well-established retailer under two games: Nash game and Stackelberg game. We show that customer returns policies can be used as competing marketing strategies. Numerical examples are included to illustrate the major results of the paper. The analysis generates insights about how the degree to which the customer accepts the no-refund product affects the new entrant retailer′s choice of customer returns policies in a competitive market. Keywords: Hotelling model; Customer returns policy; Pricing; Game equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:146:y:2013:i:1:p:246-258 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.07.005 Access Statistics for this article International Journal of Production Economics is currently edited by Stefan Minner More articles in International Journal of Production Economics from Elsevier |
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