An inverse economic lot-sizing approach to eliciting supplier cost parameters

Péter Egri, Tamás Kis, András Kovács and József Váncza

International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, vol. 149, issue C, 80-88

Abstract: Recent literature on supply chain coordination offers a wide range of game theoretic and optimization approaches that ensure efficient planning in the supply chain, but assume that the involved parties have complete information about each other. However, in reality, complete information is rarely available, and those models alone do not present any incentive for the parties to reveal their private information, e.g., the cost parameters that they use when solving their planning problems.

Keywords: Economic lot-sizing; Inverse combinatorial optimization; Eliciting cost parameters (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:149:y:2014:i:c:p:80-88

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.06.024

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