Supply chain contracting for vertically differentiated products

Mehmet Sekip Altug

International Journal of Production Economics, 2016, vol. 171, issue P1, 34-45

Abstract: We study a supply chain where the supplier sells a family of vertically differentiated products with varying quality levels through a network of distributors to end consumers who have heterogeneous valuations for quality. With traditional wholesale pricing, it has been shown that the supplier does not share the same incentives as the distributors to sell higher quality products and as a result their economics are not well aligned.

Keywords: Channel coordination; Supply chain contracting; Vertical differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925527315003953
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:171:y:2016:i:p1:p:34-45

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.10.014

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Production Economics is currently edited by Stefan Minner

More articles in International Journal of Production Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().