Competitive uncapacitated lot-sizing game

Margarida Carvalho, João Pedro Pedroso, Claudio Telha and Mathieu Van Vyve

International Journal of Production Economics, 2018, vol. 204, issue C, 148-159

Abstract: We study the strategical behaviour of firms facing a lot-sizing problem with Cournot competition. Each player is a firm with her own production facility, modeled as an uncapacitated lot-sizing problem (i.e., production incurs set-up and variable costs and inventories are allowed). A Cournot competition is played in each time period (market) with each player deciding the quantity of product to place on it. The market price of that product in each time period depends on the total quantity placed in the market.

Keywords: Cournot competition; Lot-sizing problem; Nash equilibria; Potential game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:204:y:2018:i:c:p:148-159

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.07.026

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