The optimal multi-period modular design with fairness concerns
Qingying Li
International Journal of Production Economics, 2018, vol. 206, issue C, 233-249
Abstract:
In this paper we consider a multi-period modular design model with fairness concerns. In the first period, market demand information is unknown and the retailer needs to invest in the products' modular design. After market size information becomes available, the retailer trades with the manufacturer in the second period, where we assume either the manufacturer or the retailer has a distributional fairness concern. In each case, we determine the retailer's optimal modular design decision in addition to the retailer and manufacturer's expected profits, and we compare the results with that in the conventional cases. We find that when the manufacturer is fair minded, the double marginalization effect may be exacerbated; while when the retailer is fair minded, the double marginalization effect can be mitigated. However, in both cases, a simple wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. Sensitivity analysis is also conducteds.
Keywords: Modular design; Fairness concern; Multiple-period; Supply chain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:206:y:2018:i:c:p:233-249
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.10.007
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