Impact of untrue reporting in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric inventory information

Yuyue Song

International Journal of Production Economics, 2020, vol. 230, issue C

Abstract: We consider a supplier–buyer chain where the supplier sells a single product to the buyer over a single-period selling season, but the initial inventory level at the buyer’s location is not observable to the supplier and should be reported to the supplier. The interaction between the supplier and the buyer is modeled as a Stackelberg game with asymmetric inventory information. The key feature of our model framework is the non-negative asymmetric inventory information assumption at the buyer’s location. Because of this point, some common managerial insights in the literature do not hold true anymore. For example, we have shown that the wholesale price from the supplier is not strictly decreasing in terms of the buyer’s order quantity.

Keywords: Asymmetric inventory information; Wholesale contract; Pricing sensitive demand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:230:y:2020:i:c:s0925527320301572

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2020.107788

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