Efficient and truthful multi-attribute auctions for crowdsourced delivery

Fei Xiao, Haijun Wang, Shuojia Guo, Xu Guan and Baoshan Liu

International Journal of Production Economics, 2021, vol. 240, issue C

Abstract: Crowdsourced delivery is an emerging parcel delivery paradigm that leverages occasional couriers’ excess capacities to transport goods. In a crowdsourced delivery system, couriers offer their excess trip capacities to requesters with packages of different weights and distinct valuations for the service. This paper studies the truthful and efficient multi-attribute auction design for the crowdsourced delivery. We develop a second-preferred-score and a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves score (VCG-score) auctions for both single-unit and multi-unit multi-attribute cases, where price and weight are jointly evaluated when assigning package delivery tasks. The proposed auctions lead to truthful private valuation revelation and social welfare maximization. Computational analyses show that our proposed multi-attribute auctions outperform the single-attribute auction and the fixed rate mechanism in maximizing social welfare.

Keywords: Crowdsourced delivery; Multi-attribute auction; Mechanism design; Sharing economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:240:y:2021:i:c:s0925527321002097

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108233

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