Dynamic reputation, project selection and market efficiency: The importance of small projects
Noam Shamir and
David Zvilichovsky
International Journal of Production Economics, 2022, vol. 248, issue C
Abstract:
This paper studies the execution of projects under heterogeneous execution abilities and asymmetric information. A higher ability agent, such as a talented entrepreneur, has better execution abilities and this skill advantage is more pronounced for larger and more profitable projects. Reputation, which affects the cost of financing, can be acquired following a successful execution history but may also be inferred when a more talented agent strategically forgoes the execution of certain projects. Our results highlight the role of smaller less-demanding projects in building reputation, revealing ability and increasing profits. These findings carry novel policy implications, as the relative availability of smaller less-demanding projects affects the allocation efficiency of financing and talent and may be required for the subsequent execution of larger more-demanding projects. We show how a change in the availability of such low-NPV projects may generate a significant increase in market efficiency and welfare, an increase that far exceeds their direct-NPV outcome.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Reputation; Asymmetric information; Project selection; Project financing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:248:y:2022:i:c:s0925527322000536
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2022.108460
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