 Relief items procurement and delivery through cooperation with suppliers and logistics companies considering budget constraintsYu Fan, Jianfang Shao and Xihui Wang International Journal of Production Economics, 2023, vol. 264, issue C Abstract: Cooperation between relief organisations and enterprises (e.g., suppliers and logistics companies) plays an important role in preparing for a disaster. However, current cooperating contracts signed with enterprises are far from mature and fail to attract their interests in China, while decision-makers also lack experience in allocating the limited budget in the cooperation. Hence, in this paper we aim to solve the problems through designing suitable framework agreements (FAs) with suppliers and logistics companies based on Stackelberg games, then analyse the allocation of limited budget between these two FAs to minimize the social cost. A real-world case study in China will be conducted to show the feasibility and aptness of our FAs and models. The result shows that suitable contracts with incentives can attract the enterprises’ interests, and through suitable allocation of budget, both the relief organisation and enterprises can benefit from the cooperation. Keywords: Humanitarian logistics; Procurement and delivery; Framework agreement with incentive; Stackelberg game; Social cost; Budget constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:proeco:v:264:y:2023:i:c:s0925527323002074 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2023.108975 Access Statistics for this article International Journal of Production Economics is currently edited by Stefan Minner More articles in International Journal of Production Economics from Elsevier |
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