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Partial enclosure of the commons

Christopher Costello, Nicolas Querou and Agnes Tomini

Journal of Public Economics, 2015, vol. 121, issue C, 69-78

Abstract: We examine the efficiency, distributional, and environmental consequences of assigning spatial property rights to part of a spatially-connected natural resource while the remainder is competed for by an open access fringe. We refer to this as partial enclosure of the commons. We obtain sharp analytical results regarding partial enclosure of the commons including: (1) While second best, it typically improves welfare relative to no property rights, (2) all resource users can be made better off, (3) positive rents arise in the open access area, and (4) the resource maintains higher stocks. Under spatial heterogeneity, we also characterize spatial regions that are ideal candidates for partial enclosure — typically, society should seek to enclose those patches with high environmental productivity and high self-retention, but whether high economic productivity promotes or relegates a patch may depend on one's objective.

Keywords: Incomplete property rights; Natural resources; Common property; Spatial externalities; Dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H4 H7 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Working Paper: Partial enclosure of the commons (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:121:y:2015:i:c:p:69-78

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.11.011

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