The value of technology improvements in games with externalities: A fresh look at offsetting behavior

Michael Hoy and Mattias K Polborn

Journal of Public Economics, 2015, vol. 131, issue C, 12-20

Abstract: We model the effect of safety technology improvements in a symmetric game in which each player's payoff depends on his own precaution and the other players' average precaution. We derive conditions under which an improved technology increases or decreases players' equilibrium utilities.

Keywords: Offsetting behavior; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: The Value of Technology Improvements in Games with Externalities: A Fresh Look at Offsetting Behavior (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:131:y:2015:i:c:p:12-20

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.011

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