Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams
Caleb Cox and
Brock Stoddard ()
Journal of Public Economics, 2018, vol. 161, issue C, 31-43
We experimentally investigate team behavior in repeated public goods games and use team chat logs to study motives for contribution. Subjects are matched into two-person teams, and each team makes a joint decision in each period. We compare teams with individuals and find similar overall contributions. However, initial contribution is higher and endgame effects are more pronounced for teams. We examine strategic discussions within teams and find strong evidence of concern for repeated game effects and limited backward induction. We also find evidence of confusion and explore its potential sources.
Keywords: Public goods; Experiment; Communication; Cooperation; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:161:y:2018:i:c:p:31-43
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